Voluntary Disclosure with Informed Trading in the IPO Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kumar, Praveen; Langberg, Nisan; Sivaramakrishnan, K.
• 署名单位: University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Houston System; University of Houston; Tel Aviv University; Rice University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12133
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1365-1394
• 关键词: information-content; price; decisions; FIRMS; cost; ask

摘要

We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcomingand investment efficiency is lowerwhen a greater fraction of the investment community is already informed. Moreover, managers disclose more information when the likelihood of an information event is higher, more equity is issued, or the cost of information acquisition is lower. Investment efficiency and the expected level of underpricing are non-monotonic in the likelihood that the manager is privately informed.