Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Christensen, Hans B.; Nikolaev, Valeri V.; wittenberg-Moerman, Regina
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12108
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 397-435
• 关键词: debt covenants; corporate governance; reporting quality; Control rights; conservatism; RENEGOTIATION; EFFICIENCY; STANDARDS; DESIGN; credit

摘要

This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers. Its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research. We argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved. By discussing its rich theoretical implications, we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency.