Supporting and Assessing Agents

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laux, Volker
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12173
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 995-1016
• 关键词: information; incentives; reputation; projects

摘要

This manuscript proposes a theory of why and when organizations support their employees with resources, time, and freedom beyond what seems economically optimal. The idea is that support plays an information-generating role in that it renders output more informative about employees' abilities. This effect reduces the need to gather additional information about ability via costly monitoring and commits the firm to make replacement/promotion decisions that are more sensitive to performance. Consequently, support indirectly strengthens employees' career concern incentives and reduces the pressure on costly bonus payments. I apply the model to tech companies, academia, and capital budgeting.