Hedge Fund Regulation and Fund Governance: Evidence on the Effects of Mandatory Disclosure Rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Honigsberg, Colleen
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12270
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 845-888
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; economic consequences; Operational risk; companies act; explain; returns; noncompliance; INFORMATION; COMPETITION

摘要

This paper uses three alternating changes in hedge fund regulation to study whether regulation reduces hedge funds' misreporting, and, if so, why regulation is effective. Relative to public companies, hedge fund regulation is relatively light. Much of the regime is a comply-or-explain framework that allows funds to forego compliance with governance rules, providing that they disclose their lack of compliance. The results show that regulation reduces misreporting at hedge funds. Further analysis suggests that the disclosure requirements led funds to make changes in their internal governance, such as hiring or switching the fund's auditor, and that these changes induced funds to report their financial performance more accurately.