Do Corporate Governance Analysts Matter? Evidence from the Expansion of Governance Analyst Coverage

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lehmann, Nico
• 署名单位: University of Gottingen
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12254
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 721-761
• 关键词: s-and-p-500 index additions; Sell-side analysts; information-content; MARKET; TRANSPARENCY; valuation; ratings; determinants; OWNERSHIP; liquidity

摘要

This paper examines the economic consequences of the initiation of governance analyst coverage. Governance analysts process, enhance, and disseminate governance-related information to capital market participants via, for example, governance reports and ratings. Using an exogenous shock in the United Kingdom, I find that an increase in governance analyst coverage results in increased governance quality, improved liquidity, increased financial analyst following, and improved investor breadth. These findings are consistent with governance analysts creating value for firms via monitoring, information dissemination/production, and investor recognition.