The Politics of M&A Antitrust

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mehta, Mihir N.; Srinivasan, Suraj; Zhao, Wanli
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Harvard University; Renmin University of China
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12291
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 5-53
• 关键词: mergers; acquisitions; ENFORCEMENT; COMPETITION; dispersion; MARKET

摘要

Antitrust regulators play a critical role in protecting market competition. We examine whether the political process affects antitrust reviews of merger transactions. We find that acquirers and targets located in the political districts of powerful U.S. congressional members who serve on committees with antitrust regulatory oversight receive relatively favorable antitrust review outcomes. To establish causality, we use plausibly exogenous shocks to firm-politician links and a falsification test. Additional findings suggest congressional members' incentives to influence antitrust reviews are affected by three channels: special interests, voter and constituent interests, and ideology. In aggregate, our findings suggest that the political process adversely interferes with the ability of antitrust regulators to provide independent recommendations about anticompetitive mergers.