Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bonetti, Pietro; Duro, Miguel; Ormazabal, Gaizka
• 署名单位: University of Navarra; IESE Business School; European Corporate Governance Institute
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12298
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 55-103
• 关键词: HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM; information disclosure; securities-regulation; Takeover premiums; MERGER ACTIVITY; social value; OWNERSHIP; MARKET; PRIVATE; target

摘要

This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms. We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down takeover activity.