Regulation of Compensation and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the UK
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Kleymenova, Anya; Tuna, Irem
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; University of London; London Business School
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
ISSN/ISSBN：
0021-8456
DOI：
10.1111/1475-679X.12355
发表日期：
2021
页码：
1123-1175
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies the consequences of regulating executive compensation at financial institutions by examining the introduction of the UK Remuneration Code in 2010, which aimed to change the decision-making horizon and risk-taking incentives of bank executives. We find that, although both banks and nonbanks show increased contribution and sensitivity to systemic risk in the United Kingdom post-2010, this increase is lower for UK banks, in line with the intent of the regulation. However, UK banks also experience higher unforced CEO turnover when compared to other UK firms. Therefore, while the regulation may have had the desired effect on systemic risk, it may also have given rise to some unintended consequences.
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