The Impact of Open Data on Public Procurement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duguay, Raphael; Rauter, Thomas; Samuels, Delphine
• 署名单位: Yale University; University of Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12479
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1159-1224
• 关键词: DISCLOSURE REGULATION; INFORMATION; CONTRACTS; QUALITY; RENEGOTIATION; performance; COMPETITION; incentives; DISCRETION; auctions

摘要

We examine how open procurement data affect the competitiveness of award procedures and the execution of government contracts. The European Union recently made its historical procurement notices available for bulk download in a cohesive and user-friendly database. Comparing government contracts above and below EU procurement size thresholds, we find that, after the open data initiative, procurement officials are more likely to award treated contracts through open bidding. In cross-sectional analyses, we document variation in the open bidding effect consistent with two underlying mechanisms: (1) increased scrutiny by NGOs and investigative journalists and (2) learning by national procurement regulators. However, treated contracts are also more likely to experience costly modifications because the shift to open bidding introduces rigidity that limits officials' discretion in selecting suppliers based on private information. Overall, our evidence indicates that open procurement data promote competitive bidding but lead to contracts with weaker execution performance. These inferences also hold in an alternative open data setting.