Adopting residual income-based compensation plans: Do you get what you pay for?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wallace, JS
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Irvine
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(98)00009-3
• 发表日期: 1997
• 关键词: performance; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; dividend

摘要

Managers, consultants, and the financial press assert that compensation plans based on residual income change managers' behavior. This assertion is empirically tested by selecting a sample of firms that began using a residual income performance measure in their compensation plans and comparing their performance to a control sample of firms that continue to use traditional accounting earnings-based incentives. The results generally support the adage 'you get what you measure and reward'. The results also support many hypothesized managerial actions associated with residual income-based performance measure incentives. (C) 1997 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.