CEO stock option awards and the timing of corporate voluntary disclosures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aboody, D; Kasznik, R
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(00)00014-8
• 发表日期: 2000
• 关键词: MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS; announcements; POLICY; plans; news

摘要

We investigate whether CEOs manage the timing of their voluntary disclosures around stock option awards. We conjecture that CEOs manage investors' expectations around award dates by delaying good news and rushing forward bad news. For a sample of 2,039 CEO option awards by 572 firms with fixed award schedules, we document changes in share prices and analyst earnings forecasts around option awards that are consistent with our conjecture. We also provide more direct evidence based on management earnings forecasts issued prior to award dates. Our findings suggest that CEOs make opportunistic voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: M41; D82.