An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based compensation plan

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Banker, RD; Lee, SY; Potter, G; Srinivasan, D
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Sungshin Women's University; Cornell University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00016-7
• 发表日期: 2000
• 关键词: self-selection; incentives; turnover; MARKET; pay

摘要

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees' performance declines before they leave the firm. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.