Disclosure bias

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Fischer, PE; Verrecchia, RE
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.07.001
• 发表日期: 2004
• 关键词: information; incentives; oligopoly; cournot; equilibrium; bertrand; duopoly; MARKET

摘要

We suggest that transparent bias in management disclosures may result from managers processing information in a heuristic, as distinct from Bayesian, fashion when they face imperfect or head-to-head competition. We predict that transparent bias in disclosures is positively related to the extent of head-to-head competition. In addition, when disclosure is discretionary, we show that managers who exhibit viable, heuristic behavior are less likely to disclose than managers who exhibit Bayesian behavior. Finally, when disclosure is discretionary, we show that the increase in the proportion of uninformed managers who exhibit viable, heuristic behavior encourages more disclosure by an informed manager. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.