Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bushman, R; Chen, Q; Engel, E; Smith, A
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.005
• 发表日期: 2004
• 关键词: executive-compensation; performance-measures; BOARD COMPOSITION; ceo compensation; BONUS SCHEMES; diversification; OWNERSHIP; DIRECTORS; EFFICIENCY; spinoffs

摘要

We posit that limited transparency of firms' operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. We investigate how ownership concentration, directors' and executive's incentives, and board structure vary with: (1) earnings timeliness, and (2) organizational complexity measured as geographic and/or product line diversification. We find that ownership concentration, directors' and executives' equity-based incentives, and outside directors' reputations vary inversely with earnings timeliness, and that ownershi concentration, and directors' equity-based incentives increase with firm complexity. However, board size and the percentage of inside directors do not vary significantly with earnings timeliness or firm complexity. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.