Benefits of a slanted view: a discussion of 'disclosure bias'

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Arya, A; Mittendorf, B
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.07.002
• 发表日期: 2004
• 关键词: information

摘要

Fischer and Verrecchia (J. Account. Econom. (2004), forthcoming) studies a model of imperfect competition in which firms' disclosures are affected by biased information processing. They find that optimism can add punch to a firm's actions. When facing an optimist, a rival is forced to soften its competitive posture, thereby rendering such biases viable. Although the setting provides a cogent explanation for disclosure bias, its reliance on imperfect information processing introduces some questions. One concern is the ease with which polar results can be obtained when the rules-of-the-game are sufficiently relaxed. The discussion provides examples illustrating this and related issues. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.