Discussion of: Investor protection under unregulated financial reporting (by Jan!Barton and Gregory!Waymire)
成果类型：
Editorial Material
署名作者：
Leftwich, R
署名单位：
University of Chicago
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0165-4101
DOI：
10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.09.003
发表日期：
2004
关键词：
摘要：
Barton and Waymire (J. Account. Fcon. (this issue)) investigate voluntary accounting disclosure practices in the 1920s. They conclude that managers' incentives explain, in part, cross-sectional reporting differences. Moreover, the authors conclude that firms with higher quality financial reporting experienced substantially lower price declines when stock prices dropped so dramatically in October 1929. Their first finding seems incontrovertible, albeit less surprising. Their second finding is more ambitious, but is questionable, given the limitations of the theory and the empirical tests they employ. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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