Discussion of the effects of corporate governance on firms' credit ratings
成果类型：
Article; Proceedings Paper
署名作者：
Weber, Joseph
署名单位：
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0165-4101
DOI：
10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.02.002
发表日期：
2006
关键词：
摘要：
Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond [2006. The effects of corporate governance on firms' credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics (this issue)] find that better governed firms receive better credit ratings and poor governance costs the median speculative grade firm $38 million in excess interest. They also find that managers choose to be poorly governed to expropriate wealth. The results from the primary analysis are persuasive, leaving little doubt on whether qratings agencies value corporate governance. However, the authors' estimate of the economic costs of poor governance is likely to be overstated. Despite the evidence on the costs of poor governance, the final analysis leaves the question as to why firms choose to be poorly governed largely unanswered. (c) 2006 Published by Elsevier B.V.
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