The effects of corporate governance on firms' credit ratings

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Ashbaugh-Skaife, Hollis; Collins, Daniel W.; LaFond, Ryan
• 署名单位: University of Iowa; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2006.02.003
• 发表日期: 2006
• 关键词: NONAUDIT SERVICES; auditor independence; earnings management; Ownership structure; leveraged buyouts; Bond ratings; performance; BOARD; INFORMATION; COMMITTEE

摘要

We investigate whether firms with strong corporate governance benefit from higher credit ratings relative to firms with weaker governance. We document, after controlling for firm-specific risk characteristics, that credit ratings are negatively associated with the number of blockholders and CEO power, and positively related to takeover defenses, accrual quality, earnings timeliness, board independence, board stock ownership, and board expertise. We also provide evidence that CEOs of firms with speculative-grade credit ratings are overcompensated to a greater degree than their counterparts at firms with investment-grade ratings, thus providing one explanation for why some firms operate with weak governance. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.