The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ramanna, Karthik
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.11.006
• 发表日期: 2008
• 关键词: Campaign contributions; earnings; set

摘要

I study the evolution of SFAS 142, which uses unverifiable fair-value estimates to account for acquired goodwill. I find evidence consistent with the FASB issuing SFAS 142 in response to political pressure over its proposal to abolish pooling accounting. The result is interesting given this proposal was due in part to SEC concerns over pooling misuse. I also find evidence consistent with lobbying support for SFAS 142 increasing in firms' discretion under the standard. Agency theory predicts such unverifiable discretion can be used opportunistically. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.