Discussion of The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: Evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Skinner, Douglas J.
署名单位：
University of Chicago
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0165-4101
DOI：
10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.11.005
发表日期：
2008
关键词：
摘要：
Ramanna [2007. The implications of unverifiable fair-value accounting: evidence from the political economy of goodwill accounting, Journal of Accounting and Economics] provides interesting and novel evidence on how firms use contributions from their political action committees (PACs) to members of Congress as a means of lobbying for preferred positions on the two exposure drafts that led to SFAS-141 and SFAS-142. My discussion raises some concerns about his main conclusion: that pooling firms lobbied the FASB to obtain a fair-value -based impairment rule to facilitate their ability to manipulate financial statements. I offer a more benign explanation and make some other observations about how this line of research could proceed in the future. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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