A tale of two intermediaries: A discussion of Johnston, Markov and Ramnath (2009), and Cheng and Neamtiu (2009)

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolasinski, Adam C.
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.11.003
• 发表日期: 2009
• 关键词: propensity score; causal

摘要

Cheng and Neamtiu examine whether credit rating agencies exploit market power to sell a substandard product. Their evidence is suggestive, but plausible alternative hypotheses could explain their results. Johnston, Markov and Ramnath provide first evidence on the bond and firm characteristics that determine the quantity of sell-side debt analyst coverage that a corporate bond receives. They also find that debt analysts anticipate credit rating changes and add information to markets incremental to credit ratings, suggesting debt analysts will be important to future research on bond markets. These results also suggest a method for refining tests of rating agency market power. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.