Investor perceptions of board performance: Evidence from uncontested director elections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fischer, Paul E.; Gramlich, Jeffrey D.; Miller, Brian P.; White, Hal D.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Maine System; University of Southern Maine; Copenhagen Business School; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.09.002
• 发表日期: 2009
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; ceo turnover; SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM; PROXY CONTESTS; COMPENSATION; FIRMS; heteroskedasticity; INFORMATION; COMPETITION; mechanisms

摘要

This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers. In addition, firms with low vote approval are more likely to experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and better-received acquisitions, and more and better-received divestitures in the future. These findings hold after controlling for other variables reflecting or determining investor perceptions, suggesting that elections not only inform as a summary statistic, but incrementally inform as well. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.