The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Armstrong, Christopher S.; Guay, Wayne R.; Weber, Joseph P.
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001
• 发表日期: 2010
• 关键词: ceo cash compensation; earnings management; Audit committee; moral hazard; Accounting information; STOCK-PRICE; EMPIRICAL-RESEARCH; equity incentives; INTERNAL CONTROL; VALUE-RELEVANCE

摘要

We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues for future research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts and governance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contracting parties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contracting parties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debt contracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reporting transparency in facilitating informal multiperiod contracts among managers, directors, shareholders, and creditors. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.