Sarbanes-Oxley and corporate risk-taking

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bargeron, Leonce L.; Lehn, Kenneth M.; Zutter, Chad J.
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.05.001
• 发表日期: 2010
• 关键词: internal control; determinants; boards

摘要

We empirically examine whether risk-taking by publicly traded US companies declined significantly after adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Several provisions of SOX are likely to discourage risk-taking, including an expanded role for independent directors, an increase in director and officer liability, and rules related to internal controls. We find several Measures of risk-taking decline significantly for US versus non-US firms after SOX. The magnitudes of the declines are related to several firm characteristics, including pre-SOX board structure, firm size, and R&D expenditures. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that SOX discourages risk-taking by public US companies. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.