Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feng, Mei; Ge, Weili; Luo, Shuqing; Shevlin, Terry
• 署名单位: University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.005
• 发表日期: 2011
• 关键词: Equity incentives; financial-statements; irregularities; COMPENSATION; Managers; IMPACT; FRAUD; CEOS

摘要

This paper examines why CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations. We find that while CFOs bear substantial legal costs when involved in accounting manipulations, these CFOs have similar equity incentives to the CFOs of matched non-manipulation firms. In contrast, CEOs of manipulation firms have higher equity incentives and more power than CEOs of matched firms. Taken together, our findings are consistent with the explanation that CFOs are involved in material accounting manipulations because they succumb to pressure from CEOs, rather than because they seek immediate personal financial benefit from their equity incentives. AAER content analysis reinforces this conclusion. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.