Evidence on differences between recognition and disclosure: A comparison of inputs to estimate fair values of employee stock options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Choudhary, Preeti
• 署名单位: Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.004
• 发表日期: 2011
• 关键词: VALUE-RELEVANCE; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; voluntary recognition; earnings management; COMPENSATION; FIRMS; MODEL

摘要

I investigate reliability differences across recognition and disclosure regimes to shed light on differing incentives and reporting of employee stock option (ESO) fair values. I compare ESO fair values based on firm-reported inputs with ESO fair values based on benchmark inputs, estimated following authoritative guidance. On average, I find opportunism increases with recognition as compared with disclosure, and that it is associated with incentives to manage earnings. Despite the increase in opportunism, I find that accuracy does not decline for recognizers, and that accuracy differs across voluntary and mandatory recognition. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.