Are voluntary disclosures that disavow the reliability of mandated fair value information informative or opportunistic?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blacconiere, Walter G.; Frederickson, James R.; Johnson, Marilyn F.; Lewis, Melissa F.
• 署名单位: Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.09.002
• 发表日期: 2011
• 关键词: EMPLOYEE STOCK-OPTIONS; MANAGERIAL DISCRETION; compensation expense; earnings; price; RECOGNITION; incentives; valuation; divergence; volatility

摘要

One consequence of the shift to fair value measurement is the emergence of voluntary disclosures in audited financial statements that question the reliability of mandated fair value information. We refer to these disclosures as reliability disavowals. We examine stock option volatility estimates disclosed under SFAS 123 and test whether disavowals are informative (opportunistic) by examining whether ex ante firm characteristics, forecast bias, and prediction difficulty are consistent with informative (opportunistic) disclosure. Our results support the hypothesis that disavowals inform users about the reliability of volatility estimates, but there is also limited evidence consistent with managers using disavowals opportunistically. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.