Mandatory clawback provisions, information disclosure, and the regulation of securities markets
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Denis, Diane K.
署名单位：
Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0165-4101
DOI：
10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.07.002
发表日期：
2012
关键词：
摘要：
Chan et al. (2012) find that voluntary adoption of compensation clawback provisions is followed by fewer financial restatements and fewer auditor reports of material internal control weaknesses, higher earnings response coefficients, and reduced auditing fees and lags. They conclude that voluntary adoption of clawback provisions leads to increased financial integrity. Based on these findings they suggest that U.S. government mandated clawback provisions will be effective in reducing material financial misstatements. I offer possible alternative interpretations of CCCY's results and discuss issues surrounding government regulation of clawback provisions in particular and corporate behavior more generally. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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