Does Regulation FD work? Evidence from analysts' reliance on public disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kross, William J.; Suk, Inho
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.11.004
• 发表日期: 2012
• 关键词: regulation fair disclosure; information-content; EARNINGS FORECASTS; CONFERENCE CALLS; determinants; management; guidance; MARKET

摘要

We examine how Regulation FD changed analysts' reliance on firms' public disclosure. Regulation FD is associated with a stronger analyst response to earnings announcements, management forecasts and conference calls-that is, analysts respond to these events more quickly, more frequently and with larger forecast revisions after FD. Further, following public disclosure, the decline in analyst forecast dispersion and forecast error accelerates after FD. We find no such changes either for foreign ADR firms or around several confounding events. Overall, Regulation FD levels the playing field between the analysts and individual investors, thereby promoting fair game property of the market. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.