The incentives for tax planning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Armstrong, Christopher S.; Blouin, Jennifer L.; Larcker, David F.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.04.001
• 发表日期: 2012
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; earnings management; antitakeover protection; PERFORMANCE-MEASUREMENT; EQUITY GRANTS; Firm value; trade-off; income; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION

摘要

We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax director exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with the other tax attributes. We interpret these results as indicating that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.