Nonprofit boards: Size, performance and managerial incentives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aggarwal, Rajesh K.; Evans, Mark E.; Nanda, Dhananjay
• 署名单位: University of Miami; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.08.001
• 发表日期: 2012
• 关键词: agency problems; ORGANIZATIONS

摘要

We examine relations between board size, managerial incentives and enterprise performance in nonprofit organizations. We posit that a nonprofit's demand for directors increases in the number of programs it pursues, resulting in a positive association between program diversity and board size. Consequently, we predict that board size is inversely related to managerial pay-performance incentives and positively with overall organization performance. We find empirical evidence consistent with our hypotheses. The number of programs is positively related to board size. Board size is associated negatively with managerial incentives, positively with program spending and fundraising performance, and negatively with commercial revenue, in levels and changes. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.