The London Stock Exchange's AIM experiment: Regulatory or market failure? A discussion of Gerakos, Lang and Maffett

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Piotroski, Joseph D.
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.10.004
• 发表日期: 2013
• 关键词: SARBANES-OXLEY-ACT; Investor protection; performance; finance; RISK

摘要

The conference paper by Gerakos, Lang and Maffett (2013) provides reliable, descriptive evidence on the post-IPO performance of firms listing on the London Stock Exchange's Alternative Investment Market (AIM). Their findings are consistent with both a failure of private sector regulation and incorrect market expectations about AIM's investor protections. In this discussion of Gerakos et al. (2013), I highlight the strengths and limitations of their conference paper, summarize how various regulatory and market factors could produce the observed systematic under-performance of AIM offerings, and outline paths for future research on the topic. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.