Non-discretionary conservatism: Evidence and implications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lawrence, Alastair; Sloan, Richard; Sun, Yuan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.10.005
• 发表日期: 2013
• 关键词: ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM; asymmetric timeliness; earnings conservatism; to-book; OWNERSHIP; MARKET

摘要

A large body of accounting research finds that various contracting incentives lead managers to engage in conservative accounting practices. We extend existing research by modeling the impact of extant accounting rules on conservative accounting. Accounting rules typically require assets to be written down when their fair values drop sufficiently below their book values. We document evidence of the resulting non-discretionary conservatism and show that it appears to explain some of the results from previous research on contracting incentives. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.