Post-listing performance and private sector regulation: The experience of London's Alternative Investment Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gerakos, Joseph; Lang, Mark; Matfett, Mark
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.08.004
• 发表日期: 2013
• 关键词: earnings management; STOCK; INFORMATION; disclosure; Auditors; FRAUD; size; IPO; ACT

摘要

We investigate the experience of companies listing and raising capital on the AIM, which is privately regulated and relies on Nominated Advisors who compete for listings and provide regulatory oversight. AIM firms underperform newly listed firms on traditionally regulated exchanges based on post-listing returns and failure rates, comparable to firms listing on the unregulated US Pink Sheets, and exhibit abnormally high pre-listing accruals and post-listing reversals. High quality auditors and Nomads partially mitigate underperformance, suggesting that AIM firms have limited ability to bond through more stringent oversight. Underperformance is particularly pronounced for firms with higher proportions of retail investors. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.