Commitment to social good and insider trading

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gao, Feng; Lisic, Ling Lei; Zhang, Ivy Xiying
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; George Mason University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.03.001
• 发表日期: 2014
• 关键词: Information asymmetry; corporate governance; nonfinancial disclosure; RESPONSIBILITY; reputation; performance; Managers; COMPENSATION; incentives; culture

摘要

A firm's investment in corporate social responsibility (CSR) builds a positive image of caring for social good and imposes additional costs on executives' informed trading, which is widely perceived self-serving. We thus expect executives of CSR-conscious firms to be more likely to refrain from informed trading. We find that executives of CSR-conscious firms profit significantly less from insider trades and are less likely to trade prior to future news than executives of non-CSR-conscious firms. The negative association between CSR and insider trading profits is more pronounced when executives' personal interests are more aligned with the interests of the firm. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.