Large shareholders and disclosure strategies: Evidence from IPO lockup expirations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ertimur, Yonca; Sletten, Ewa; Sunder, Jayanthi
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; Boston College; University of Arizona
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.06.002
• 发表日期: 2014
• 关键词: MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS; initial public offerings; discretionary disclosure; institutional investors; voluntary disclosures; Venture capitalists; stock returns; REGULATION FD; MARKET; INFORMATION

摘要

We examine the effect of large shareholders' ex ante selling incentives on firms' voluntary disclosure choices in the setting of IPO lockup expirations. We find evidence that managers delay disclosures of bad news, not for their own benefit, but to enable influential pre-IPO shareholders to sell their shares at more favorable prices. Delays are more pronounced when aggregate selling incentives are greater, when uncertainty is high, and when venture capitalists, influential investors with strong selling incentives, own more shares. Simultaneously, managers' disclosure decisions reflect litigation concerns: no significant delays occur when litigation risk is high or when managers trade themselves. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.