The role of bank monitoring in borrowers' discretionary disclosure: Evidence from covenant violations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Vashishtha, Rahul
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.04.002
• 发表日期: 2014
• 关键词: MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS; corporate governance; information-content; lending relationships; Control rights; debt; MARKET; determinants; boards; CONSEQUENCES

摘要

This study uses covenant violations to provide evidence on how firms make disclosure decisions in the presence of enhanced bank monitoring. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that firms reduce disclosure following covenant violations. A series of analyses suggest that part of this decline in disclosure reflects a delegation of monitoring to banks by shareholders who consequently demand less disclosure. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.