Market (in)attention and the strategic scheduling and timing of earnings announcements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: deHaan, Ed; Shevlin, Terry; Thornock, Jacob
• 署名单位: Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.03.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 关键词: BAD-NEWS; INFORMATION; attention; COMPENSATION; DISCLOSURES; Timeliness; CEOS

摘要

We investigate whether managers hide bad news by announcing earnings during periods of low attention, or by providing less forewarning of an upcoming earnings announcement. Our findings are consistent with managers reporting bad news after market hours, on busy days, and with less advance notice, and with earnings receiving less attention in these settings. Paradoxically, our findings indicate that managers also report bad news on Fridays, but we do not find lower attention on Fridays. Further, we find negative returns when the market is notified of an upcoming Friday earnings announcement, which is consistent with investors inferring forthcoming bad news. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.