Discussion of: Rank and file employees and the discovery of misreporting: The role of stock options
成果类型：
Editorial Material
署名作者：
Sloan, Richard G.
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0165-4101
DOI：
10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.10.002
发表日期：
2016
关键词：
摘要：
Call, Kedia and Rajgopal (2016) provide intriguing evidence concerning the apparent role of employee stock options in inducing rank and file employees to be complicit in corporate misconduct. They conclude that granting options to rank and file employees provides incentives for them to facilitate misreporting and discourages them from whistleblowing. In this discussion, I argue that the evidence is largely circumstantial and puzzling in several respects. I conclude that while Call et al. have identified intriguing evidence, further research is required to rule out alternative explanations and to better understand employees' motives. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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