Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the poor man's private equity funds

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dimitrova, Lora
• 署名单位: University of Exeter
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.10.003
• 发表日期: 2017
• 关键词: OPERATING PERFORMANCE; acquiring firms; tell us; corporate; IPO; OWNERSHIP; liquidity; payment; improve; MARKET

摘要

Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are an alternative investment, structured as a one-shot private equity (PE) deal. Significant cross-sectional variation exists in SPACs' performance, which can be explained by the strong implicit incentives embedded in contracts. SPAC performance is worse for acquisitions announced near the predetermined two-year deadline, for acquisitions with deferred initial public offering underwriting fees, and for acquisitions with market value close to the required 80% threshold. Also, sponsors' involvement in the merged firm's governance improves long-term performance. This evidence has important implications given SPACs' high popularity in recent years and the new PE industry's trend toward deal-by-deal fund-raising. Crown Copyright (C) 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.