Accounting standards, regulatory enforcement, and innovation
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Laux, Volker; Stocken, Phillip C.
署名单位：
University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Dartmouth College
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0165-4101
DOI：
10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.001
发表日期：
2018
关键词：
摘要：
We examine the effects of accounting standards and regulatory enforcement on entrepreneurial innovation and social welfare. When the entrepreneur issues a financial report that violates the accounting standards, a regulatory agency may detect the violation and bring charges. We find that when regulatory penalties are relatively insensitive to the magnitude of the violation, optimal standards are sufficiently low that they induce full compliance, and increase as the intensity of enforcement increases. In contrast, when regulatory penalties are sensitive to the magnitude of the violation, optimal standards induce non-compliance and decline as the intensity of enforcement increases. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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