The consequences to analyst involvement in the IPO process: Evidence surrounding the JOBS Act

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dambra, Michael; Field, Laura Casares; Gustafson, Matthew T.; Pisciotta, Kevin
• 署名单位: State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; University of Delaware; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Kansas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.12.001
• 发表日期: 2018
• 关键词: SELL-SIDE ANALYSTS; initial public offerings; CONFLICTS-OF-INTEREST; Regulation Fair Disclosure; biased earnings forecasts; investment banks compete; REGULATION FD; stock recommendations; GLOBAL SETTLEMENT; INFORMATION

摘要

The JOBS Act allows certain analysts to be more involved in the IPO process, but does not relax restrictions on analyst compensation structure. We find that these analysts initiate coverage that is more optimistically biased, less accurate, and generates smaller stock market reactions. Investors purchasing shares following these initiations lose over 3% of their investment by the firm's subsequent earnings release. By contrast, issuers, analysts, and investment banks appear to benefit from this increased bias, as optimism is more positively associated with proxies for firm visibility and investment banking revenues when analysts are involved in the IPO process. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.