Do women managers keep firms out of trouble? Evidence from corporate litigation and policies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Adhikari, Binay K.; Agrawal, Anup; Malm, James
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Rio Grande Valley; University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; College of Charleston
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.09.004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: gender; RISK; incentives; INVESTMENT; INNOVATION; attitudes; DIRECTORS; IMPACT

摘要

We find that firms where women have more power in the top management team, measured by female executives' plurality and pay slice, face fewer operations-related lawsuits. This effect is robust to several treatments of endogeneity and does not appear to be driven by female executives' greater willingness to settle the cases. Evidence from a simultaneous equations approach suggests that firms where women executives have more power avoid lawsuits partly by avoiding some risky but value-increasing firm policies, such as more aggressive R&D, intensive advertising, and policies inimical to other parties.