Insights into auditor public oversight boards: Whether, how, and why they work

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hanlon, Michelle; Shroff, Nemit
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101497
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: pcaob inspections; economic-theory; QUALITY; FIRMS; improve; SOX

摘要

We survey 170 inspectors, representing 27% of the inspection staff, from auditor public oversight boards (POBs) in 20 countries to understand whether, how, and why auditors respond to POB oversight. We find that a large majority of inspectors believe that auditors frequently respond to their feedback by changing audit procedures and quality control systems. Inspectors perceive inspections to have broad effects on several aspects of auditing, ranging from documentation to the removal of partners. Some inspectors perceive that auditors place greater weight on keeping fees low than on increasing audit quality. Inspectors also believe that auditors on occasion 'fix' closed audit files before an inspection, and in rare instances obtain confidential information about upcoming inspections. Inspectors think that the primary reasons why auditors respond to POB feedback are (1) public disclosure, (2) enforcement capabilities, (3) POBs being perceived as authoritative, and (4) POBs having a culture for detecting auditing deficiencies. (C) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.