Mandatory disclosure and learning from external market participants: Evidence from the JOBS act

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pinto, Jedson
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101528
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: information; INVESTMENT; prices

摘要

This paper examines whether mandatory disclosure affects the extent to which firms learn from external market participants. Conventional wisdom suggests that mandatory disclosure should increase the total amount of information in financial markets. However, disclosure can also reduce investors' incentives to acquire and produce information. Using the JOBS Act to identify variations in disclosure requirements, this paper finds that firms with reduced disclosure requirements attract more informed investors and learn more from financial markets than those with stricter disclosure requirements. This learning is concentrated among firms that attract sophisticated investors, particularly those with industry expertise, and weakens once firms are forced to disclose more information. Overall, the results suggest that one benefit from regulators' recent efforts to reduce U.S. firm disclosure requirements is an increase in firm learning.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.