Learning from peers: Evidence from disclosure of consumer complaints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dou, Yiwei; Hung, Mingyi; She, Guoman; Wang, Lynn Linghuan
• 署名单位: New York University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2023.101620
• 发表日期: 2024
• 关键词: product market predation; adverse selection; Trade credit; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; entry; securitization; COMPETITION; reputation; cost

摘要

In 2013, the U.S. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau released a database of consumer complaints filed against banks under its supervision ( CFPB banks ). We find that after the disclosure, rival banks exhibit a greater increase in mortgage approval rates in markets with more intensive mortgage complaints about CFPB banks. The effect is weaker when rivals have more expertise in the local market, are less concerned about credit risk due to mortgage sales, and locate in areas with more alternative information about the CFPB banks. The effect is concentrated in severe complaints and complaints related to loan underwriting practices. In addition to approving more loans, rivals also open more branches and are more likely to post a job opening in these markets. The findings suggest that these banks learn from the nonfinancial disclosures about operational deficiencies of peers (i.e., CFPB banks) in local markets, which alleviates their adverse selection concern about expanding. (c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.