Board risk oversight and environmental and social performance☆

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Amiraslani, Hami; Deller, Carolyn; Ittner, Christopher D.; Keusch, Thomas
• 署名单位: INSEAD Business School; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania; INSEAD Business School
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101754
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; default; cost; intensity; IMPACT; FIRMS; debt

摘要

We examine the relation between board risk oversight and environmental and social (E&S) performance. Our study is motivated by heightened awareness of E&S risks and growing calls for their inclusion in the purview of board risk oversight. Using a novel proprietary dataset on board risk oversight for an international sample, we find that firms with more extensive board risk oversight are more likely to institute E&S compensation, set environmental (but not social) targets, adopt policies that address E&S risks and opportunities, and issue an E&S report. Our exploratory evidence also shows that more extensive board risk oversight is associated with better environmental outcomes, specifically lower monetized environmental costs, but worse social outcomes, namely lower monetized employee benefits and a higher likelihood of social risk incidents. Our results suggest that risk oversight is analogous to a constrained optimization problem whereby risk exposures are prioritized and receive different degrees of oversight consideration by the board.