Mitigating risk-shifting in corporate pension plans: Evidence from stakeholder constituency statutes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Garman, Amy D.; Kubick, Thomas R.
• 署名单位: Kansas State University; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101704
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: SOCIAL-RESPONSIBILITY; financing constraints; capital structure; INVESTMENT; ceo; COMPENSATION; management; MARKET; debt; firm

摘要

We use staggered enactments of state stakeholder constituency laws as a natural experiment to examine the effect of such laws on corporate pension risk shifting. Our analysis encompasses three components of pension risk shifting: funding risk, investment risk, and benefit risk. We observe a reduction in all three elements of pension risk shifting following the enactment of stakeholder orientation laws that promote greater consideration of stakeholder interests. We also find that the post-enactment reduction in pension risk-shifting is greater for firms with fewer investment opportunities. Overall, our results provide insight into how stakeholder constituency can mitigate an important form of risk-shifting.