Equity-based compensation and the timing of share repurchases: the role of the corporate calendar

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dittmann, Ingolf; Li, Amy Yazhu; Obernberger, Stefan; Zheng, Jiaqi (Jacky)
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Peking University; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101798
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: information-content; payout policy; STOCK; governance; INSIDERS; returns; Buyback; 10b5-1; TRADE

摘要

We examine whether CEOs use share repurchases to sell their equity at inflated prices. We document that share repurchases, like equity-based compensation, are affected by the corporate calendar-the firm's schedule of earnings announcements and insider trading restrictions. The corporate calendar can fully explain why share repurchases and equity-based compensation coincide. The alignment with the corporate calendar is stricter in firms with strong internal governance or high external monitoring. When CEOs sell equity, firms are actually less likely to repurchase. Our findings reconcile earlier studies and highlight the importance of the corporate calendar for the timing of share repurchases.