Do signatory auditors with tax expertise facilitate or curb tax aggressiveness?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Defond, Mark; Qi, Baolei; Si, Yi; Zhang, Jieying
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; Xi'an Jiaotong University; Xi'an Jiaotong University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101715
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: earnings management; avoidance evidence; corporate governance; industry expertise; incentives; GOVERNMENT; SANCTIONS; accruals; QUALITY; FIRMS

摘要

Prior research concludes that tax-expert auditors facilitate tax aggressiveness. However, these studies examine auditors who also provide non-audit tax services to their clients, creating conflicting incentives. We predict that tax-expert auditors, who do not provide non-audit tax services, reduce tax aggressiveness, because tax aggressiveness imposes costs on them. We test our prediction using Chinese data, allowing us to identify Certified Tax Agents as tax-expert auditors. We find that companies are less tax aggressive when their signatory auditor is a tax-expert who does not provide non-audit tax services. Consistent with a causal relation, a decrease in tax rates, which reduces clients' incentives to be tax aggressive, weakens the effect of tax-expertise on tax aggressiveness. Moreover, tax-expert auditors attenuate the type of tax aggressiveness that results in tax-related misstatements. Overall, by examining auditors who do not provide non-audit tax services, we find that tax-expert auditors curb tax aggressiveness, contrary to prior research.